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1.O Introduction 
"The uncertainty of economie arguments renders language important. The 
vision that its concepts convey can be a decisive reason for acceptan-
ce of an argument. Choosing the right words, therefore, is crucial in 
economie discourses." 
Arjo Klamer (1985) 
In economie science concepts have sometimes a different kind of 
meaning when used by different groups of like-minded economists. For 
example, a monetarist interpretation of monetary control differs 
significantly from a non-monetarist perception. Inconsistencies 
regarding formulation and definition of basic concepts in economie 
science complicate discussion and result in unnecessary talking at 
cross-purposes1. Therefore, to avoid any misunderstanding section 2 
will be devoted to the discussion and definition of the concept of 
monetary control. 
In section 3 some implications of the analysis of monetary control for 
Japan will be presented. 
It has to be mentioned that many ideas presented in this paper origi-
nate from research regarding the Japanese financial system and moneta-
ry policy. The concepts and ideas presented in this paper make up the 
foundation of the author's research with respect to monetary policy in 
Japan. Before starting model and empirical analyses, one should be 
perfectly clear about the terminologies and concepts to use. This 
seems to be especially important with respect to research about Japan, 
a country sometimes difficult to understand for non-Japanese. The 
author has the impression that the following interpretations and 
definitions of monetary control fit into a theoretical framework 
regarding monetary control in Japan. 
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2.0 Monetary control 
The concept of monetary control is one of the most used and dlscussed 
terminologies in monetary theory. Over the past 25 years, monetary 
control has attracted attention of many economists from various 
schools of thought. To quote Lombra (1980): "The literature on moneta-
ry control was one of the few things that grew faster than the money 
stock during the 1970s."2 
However, this rapid growth of literature has been accompanled by a 
corresponding growth in different perceptions and interpretations of 
monetary control, resulting in confusion and inconsistencies in the 
underlying terminology and theoretical framework3. Therefore, in this 
section the general concept of monetary control will be dlscussed. 
According to the Oxford Guide to the English Language*, control can 
have one of the following meanings: power to give orders or restrain 
something; means of restraining or regulating; check. 
In economics especially the first 2 interpretations of control seem to 
be important. The power aspect of control can be interpreted as the 
extent to which a certain body can influence or direct the development 
of a certain process or influence a certain variable at a specific 
point of time in a specific desired direction. This interpretation is 
strongly intertwined with the degree of effectiveness of the control 
exercised. The second meaning is related to the perception of control 
as a specific instrument of a certain body to implement its policies. 
Both aspects of control in economics have been implicitly recognized 
by Tinbergen. In his "On the Theory of Economie Policy", Tinbergen 
discusses the power and instrument perceptions of control within the 
framework of economie policy. Instruments are "... variables under the 
command of the government"5, and "... may be overall-controls or 
detailed controls"6. The power-process interpretation of control can 
be found in Tinbergen's theoretical framework regarding questions of 
economie policy. His distinction between targets and Instruments7 
assumes a certain degree of power of the government policymakers with 
respect to the use of the policy instruments and the realization of 
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the policy goals. Otherwise this distinction would be quite meaning-
less for the actual implementation of economie policy. The power of 
the authoritive body "to get things done" is reflected in the question 
of the effectiveness of its various Instruments, according to Tinber-
gen "The central question of economie policy"8. 
The conceptual framework of Tinbergen regarding issues of economie 
policy has been widely foliowed by others and consequently his impli-
cit interpretations of control as an instrument (a control) or the 
degree of (successfull) power over the process of implementing econo-
mie policy. Both interpretations can also be found in the literature 
on monetary control. 
Before starting the analysis of the instrument versus the power-
process interpretations of monetary control, it has to be mentioned 
that in the following analysis of monetary control a relatively strict 
definition of monetary policy will be used. Table 2.1 gives a concise 
survey of two possible interpretations of monetary policy. 
Table 2.1 Broad versus strict definition of monetary policy9 
Monetary policy in broad sense: 
- Structural policy 
} Supervisory policy 
- Prudential policy 
- Monetary policy in strict sense 
Monetary policy broadly defined can be simply interpreted at the whole 
complex of policies implemented by the monetary authorities. As main 
elements of monetary policy in broad sense can be mentioned structural 
policy, prudential policy and strictly defined monetary policy. The so 
called structural policy concerns the structure of the financial 
system, i.e. the whole structure of financial institutions and finan-
cial markets10. Examples of structural policy are decisions regarding 
the kind of business various financial institutions are allowed to 
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perform (for example, banking versus securities business), regulations 
with respect to the location of new branches and listing procedures at 
stock exchanges. Prudential policy deals according to Wessels (1987) 
with "... the way financial institutions operate as firms and is 
ultimately aimed at maintaining the continuity of the banking sy-
stem"11. Important Instruments of prudential policy are capital 
adequacy ratios and liquidity or reserve requirements12. 
The main goal of both structural and prudential policies is ensuring 
the stability of the financial system. For that purpose the monetary 
authorities13 exert supervision by means of explicit regulations and 
informal instructions. Therefore structural and prudential policy 
together can be called supervisory policy. 
Monetary policy in strict sense is aimed at the realisation of the 
macro-economie policy goals. To achieve these goals the monetary 
authorities can use well-known policy instruments, e.g. open market 
operations and foreign exchange market interventions. 
In this study the interpretation of monetary policy will be limited to 
the restricted definition, i.e. no attention will be paid to supervi-
sory policy, on the understanding that macro-economie implications of 
reserve requirements will explicitly be included in the analysis. The 
restricted definition will also be applied to the perception of 
monetary control. 
After this necessary discussion of the interpretation of monetary 
policy we will return to the analysis of the instrument versus the 
power-process interpretations of monetary control. 
The meaning of monetary control in the sense of explicitly mentioned 
control instruments of the monetary authorities has been recognised by 
Horvitz (1979) with respect to the framework of Federal Reserve 
control in the United States. Horvitz distinguishes the monetary 
policy instruments between general controls, selective controls and 
other powers of the Federal Reserve. General controls affect credit 
markets in general, while selective controls are aimed at specific 
uses of funds1*. The other powers of the Federal Reserve consist of 
statutory instruments such as control over the maximum interest rates 
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on bank deposits and informal powers (so called moral suasion). 
In a somewhat different terminology, the interpretation of monetary 
control in the sense of controls as Instruments is presented in table 
2.2. 
Table 2.2 Instrument interpretation of monetary control15 
- Market based monetary controls: 
* direct controls: - formal 
- informal 
* indirect controls: - formal 
- informal 
- Non-market based monetary controls: 
* direct controls: - formal 
- informal 
* indirect controls: - formal 
- informal 
In this analysis controls are classified according to their character 
(market versus non-market, direct versus indirect and formal versus 
informal). The main reasons for this choice are threefold. First, this 
classification enables a more universal application. In the analysis 
of control of specific financial systems, a classification based on 
the specific economie and financial variables the monetary authorities 
intend to control (the so called target variables) is often used16. As 
examples of specifically target oriented control classifications 
interest rate controls and controls of international capital movements 
can be mentioned. Another example of an analysis of a target oriented 
control classification has been presented in Pierce (1982). Pierce 
discusses "... the major regulatory factors in the United States that 
affect control of the quantity of money"17. However, the attention on 
a specific target presupposes a specific interpretation or functioning 
of the controls concerned. With different targets, the same controls 
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can have totally different characteristics, for example with respect 
to the mechanism through which they influence these targets. Further-
more, since the structure of every financial system depends heavily on 
specific economical, financial, political, social and cultural charac-
teristics of the country concerned, the specific target variables of 
various monetary controls will be consequently determined by these 
properties. As a result, a balanced interpretation and comparison of 
monetary controls in specific and between different countries will be 
hampered. Second, from the perspective of a control based analysis it 
seems more logical to depart from the specific nature of various 
monetary controls instead of their targets. For example interest rate 
controls can vary from market to non-market based and from formal to 
informal. The characteristics of the controls exercised are for this 
study of monetary control essential, not their ultimate targets. Third 
and most important, the presented classification allows for the 
explicit introduction of a whole range of various controls in monetary 
analysis. Also controls which initially don't seem to be very impor-
tant from the perspective of monetary control can be included in the 
analysis. The classification enables us to take into account specific 
characteristics of implemented monetary controls for various coun-
tries. For example, one point of attention is based on whether or not 
and to what extent the various controls are exercised or implemented 
through the market. In other words in this case the degree to which 
the government exercises control or the market is essential. This 
distinction is especially important for countries like Japan, with 
traditional strong governmental influence on economie and other 
processes embedded in society. Furthermore, this distinction is also 
important to analyse processes such as financial liberalisation and 
financial deregulation, processes which stress the functioning of the 
market mechanism. The emphasis on formal versus informal aspects can 
also be explained by the Japansse context of this study, a context in 
which informal regulations seem to be (very?) important. For example, 
according to one observer "... as a result of deregulation, formal 
controls are being replaced by informal ones, which are more effecti-
ve"18. 
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In table 2.2 three leveIs of classification can be distinguished. 
On the first level market versus non-market based monetary controls 
are recognised. One of the basic criterions of this discourse regar-
ding the instrument interpretation of monetary control is whether the 
monetary authorities implement monetary controls through economie 
markets or not. Application of market based monetary controls influen-
ces the supply and demand conditions in one or more markets and 
consequently the level or direction of one or more target variables. 
In the case of non-market based controls the influence of market 
forces is totally eliminated. 
Secondly, direct monetary controls can be distinguished from indirect 
monetary controls. Direct monetary controls can be interpreted as 
formal or informal instructions and regulations of the monetary 
authorities through which they directly control the level or direction 
of the target variables. Direct monetary controls have the advantage 
of direct control by the monetary authorities over certain or groups 
of certain target variables. Vice versa, indirect monetary controls do 
not have a direct impact on the target variables, but influence these 
variables through other economie and financial variables. 
Finally, the already mentioned formal and informal monetary controls 
make up the third level of classification. In the case of formal 
(regulatory) controls the monetary authorities use explicit formal 
regulations such as laws. Well known examples are laws regarding the 
upper limits of bank deposit rates, e.g. the former Regulation Q in 
the United States and the Temporary Interest Rate Adjustment Law in 
Japan, and the movement of international capital flows, for example 
the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law in Japan before 
1980. Informal regulatory controls are not based on explicit formal 
regulations but consist of informal instructions, as group of ten 
called moral suasion. The informal nature of this kind of instructions 
makes it of ten difficult to judge if and to which extent they are 
exercised or influence the economy and the target variables. Informal 
monetary regulatory controls are sometimes applied to the total amount 
of individual bank lending. It should be noticed that sometimes formal 
controls can have intended or unintended informal side-effects. This 
point has been made implicitly by Poole (1990) regarding the discount 
10 
window. The discount window can be regarded as a formal monetary 
control, since it has been laid down in some kind of central bank act. 
However, in a special situation the discount window has also an 
inforaal character. Namely, when interbank interest rates (for example 
the federal-funds rate in the United State) are above the official 
discount rate, and consequently the central bank is subsidizing the 
banking sector, "... the subsidy discount window enables the Federal 
Reserve to establish regulatory constraints that might not otherwise 
exist"19. 
It has to be mentioned that this analysis depends on which variable 
the monetary authorities choose as specific target. For different 
target variables the characteristics of individual controls change. 
For example, within the perspective of this analysis the amount of 
direct lending from the central bank (borrowed reserves) is a direct 
control regarding the monetary base (one possible target variable), 
but an indirect control regarding the money stock (another possible 
target variable). 
Table 2.2 shows that the monetary authorities have at their disposal 8 
different kinds of monetary controls (of course they can use various 
instruments within one group of these controls). It would be very 
interesting to see whether these 8 different groups of monetary 
controls could be put together in some kind of analytical framework 
(some kind of model). It is the author's intention to try so for 
Japan. 
To avoid any misunderstanding it is repeated that this study distin-
guishes between monetary controls and (monetary) instruments. From an 
analytical point of view 8 different groups of monetary controls have 
been recognised. Within every group a not necessarily equal number of 
instruments can be used by the monetary authorities. 
As an example of the above mentioned instrument interpretation of mon-
etary control, an analysis will be presented with the money stock as 
target variable. 
The best known example of a market based control which directly 
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Influences the money stock is the instrument of open market operati-
ons. The possibility of implementing open market operations is mostly 
explicitly stated in a certain law (formal control). When not, an 
informal control is effective. 
Non-sterilised foreign exchange market interventions can be mentioned 
as an example of a formal market based monetary control of indirect 
nature regarding its influence on the money stock. An informal example 
of an indirect market based monetary control is a governmental "re-
quest" to the real estate sector to refrain from speculative actions. 
This control is market based, because it influences the supply and 
demand conditions in the real estate sector. Furthermore, the request 
has an indirect impact on the money supply through its effect on total 
wealth and consequently on the total amount of collateral for bank 
credit. 
A non-market based monetary control which directly influences the 
domestic money supply is for example a law which regulates internatio-
nal capital flows in and out of the country (formal control). An 
informal control with respect to this situation is a guideline regar-
ding the amount of credit individual banks are allowed to provide 
(guideline regarding indirect borrowing), under the assumption of no 
direct borrowing as replacement for lost potential bank credit. 
Examples of indirect non-market based formal and informal monetary 
controls are respectively legal reserve requirements and the above 
mentioned informal character of the discount window in case of a 
situation when interbank interest rates are above the official dis-
count rate. A summary is presented in table 2.3. 
Table 2.3 Summary monetary controls with money stock as target 
(market, direct, formal) - open market operations, law based 
(market, direct, informal) - open market operations, not law based 
(market, indirect, formal) - non-sterilised foreign exchange market 
interventions 
(market, indirect, informal) - guideline speculations real estate 
sector 
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(non-market, direct, formal) - law international capital movements 
(non-market, direct, informal) - guideline amount of bank credit 
(non-market, indirect, formal) - legal reserve requirements 
(non-market, indirect, informal) - informal aspect discount window 
After the analysis of an interpretation of the instrument oriented 
approach of monetary control, attention will now be focused on the 
power-process perception of monetary control. This interpretation is 
mostly used in research concerning monetary control issues. However, 
it is extremely difficult to find a clear definition of monetary 
control from a power-process perspective. 
The power-process interpretation of monetary control concerns two 
major concepts, i.e. power and process. The power and process elements 
of monetary control are related to a couple of obvious questions. 
First, the questions of which institutions and/or agents exert moneta-
ry control and to what extent (whether or not successfully) are 
clearly relevant. Second, of course the goal of their exercised 
(monetary) control is important. In this respect monetary control 
could for example be interpreted as control over the money stock, 
interest rate(s), exchange rate or combinations of these variables 
(under certain circumstances). However, monetary control from a power-
process perspective is, as will become clear, nearly always interpre-
ted as control over the money stock. Furthermore, it is well known 
(and as will follow also from the subsequent analysis) that the 
process of implementing monetary policy can be divided in certain 
sections, and consequently the degree of control over the implementa-
tion of monetary policy. Different groups of economie, political 
and/or other agents and/or institutions have the ability to exert 
power to a certain degree over some or all of these sections. 
In the following presentation these aspects of monetary control in a 
context of a "power and process" framework will be discussed. However, 
before starting this analysis, a brief summary of some monetary 
terminologies will be presented. The main reason for this explicit 
analysis of terminologies and interpretations is again to avoid 
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misunderstanding and misinterpretations, and to put monetary control 
in the broader context of other monetary terminologies. The summary 
just serves as an example of the confusing and sometimes even incon-
sistent use of words and concepts in monetary policy and control 
theory. Given the huge amount of literature regarding monetary policy 
and monetary control this small survey is certainly biased and not 
complete. 
Table 2.4 Monetary Terminologies 
Monetary policy [Burger (1971)] 
Monetary policy control [B.Friedman (1975)] 
Monetary policy process [Burger (1971), B.Friedman (1975), B.Friedman 
(1977)] 
Monetary control procedures [Black (1982)] 
Monetary policy operating procedures [Walsh (1990)] 
Monetary policy strategy [Poole (1990a), Friedman (1977), Brunner 
(1980)] 
Monetary mechanism [Modigliani and Papademos (1980)] 
Monetary management [Lamfalussy (1990)] 
Money/money stock control [Poole (1976) and (1982), Bryant (1982)] 
Monetary control [Poole and Lieberman (1972), Friedman (1977), Poole 
(1977), Brunner (1980), Lombra (1980), Black (1982), Pierce (1982)] 
Monetary controls 
Monetary policy is widely discussed and defined in a great number of 
textbooks and articles. A clear definition of monetary policy has been 
presented by Burger (1971). According to Burger, monetary policy 
consists of the deliberate manipulation of the monetary policy Instru-
ments by the monetary policymakers. Another interpretation has been 
presentented in this paper, i.e. the interpretation of monetary policy 
in restricted sense. 
B.Friedman (1975) applies the terminology of monetary policy control 
(problem). In this analysis Friedman "... uses a static deterministic 
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model to define the basic elements of the targets-and-Instruments 
structure of the monetary policy control problem". He discusses the so 
called levels of the monetary policy control problem. According to 
Friedman, the monetary policy control problem can be divided in a 
broad macroeconomic level and a money market level. As an example of 
the macroeconomic level of the monetary policy control problem Fried-
man quotes Poole:"..., Poole (1970) has posed the alternative of 
monetary policy control of nominal income by means of direct control 
over either the interest rate or the money stock"20. 
The money market level is represented by "the alternative of control 
of the money stock by means of direct control over either the interest 
rate or the stock of nonborrowed reserves". In brief, Friedman seems 
to use the terminology of the monetary policy control problem to 
indicate both instrument and intermediate target problems21. 
The term monetary policy process has been described in Burger (1971). 
In his view the monetary policy process consists of two phases. In the 
first phase "... the policymakers must decide which economie variables 
they ultimately desire to influence"22. The second stage consists of 
the implementation of monetary policy. B.Friedman (1975) also uses 
monetary policy process but he does not explicitly define it23. 
B.Friedman (1977) gives a clearer picture. In his "The Inefficiency of 
Short-Run Monetary Targets for Monetary Policy" Friedman describes the 
strategy and tactics levels of the two-stage monetary policy process. 
At the strategy level the monetary authorities have to choose the 
intermediate targets with respect to the ultimate goals (for example, 
choose between the money stock and interest rate as means of influen-
cing income). At the tactics level a choice has to be made about the 
instrument the monetary authorities intend to use for controlling the 
intermediate target (for example choice between monetary base and 
interest rate as instrument for controlling the money stock). 
It will be clear that, although Burger as well as Friedman use a two-
layered perception of the monetary policy process, they have a diffe-
rent interpretation. The explicit mentioned choice of the ultimate 
objectives or goal variables in Burger (1971) (this choice is even one 
of the two phases mentioned) fails in the interpretation of Friedman. 
Of course, it would be possible to include the choice about the policy 
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goals in the analysis of Friedman, but in that case (in comparison 
with the Burger perception) Friedman's two-layered perception would 
change in a three-layered one. 
Black uses the terminology of monetary control procedures in his 
evaluation of the effects of the introduction of the reserves procedu-
re , according to Black "... the new Federal Reserve procedures for 
tighter control over monetary growth"2*, by the Federal Reserve in 
October 1979 in an open economy. In Poole (1982) the same procedure is 
analysed in terms of Federal Reserve operating procedures. 
A similar but more general defined concept is given by Walsh (1990). 
Walsh uses the terminology of monetary policy operating procedures, 
i.e. the set of rules, traditions, and practices that govern the 
implementation of monetary policy, to describe the Federal Reserve 
operating procedures during the last fifteen years. 
Poole (1991a) does the same for the last 25 years, although in terms 
of another terminology, i.e. the strategy of the Federal Reserve. With 
respect to controlling the money stock Poole distinguishes two possi-
ble control strategies: the monetary base and interest rate strategies 
of controlling the money stock. In this analysis the use of the 
concept strategy is related to the choice of the instrument by the 
monetary authorities to control the intermediate target, in this case 
the money stock. However, this interpretation of strategy in monetary 
theory is in contrast with the interpretation of the first stage or 
strategy level in B.Friedman (1977) mentioned above. Friedman's 
terminology of the tactics level or the second stage choice between 
(non-borrowed) reserves and short-term interest rates as instrument 
for controlling the money stock is comparable with the use of the term 
strategy in Poole (1991a). To make things even more complicated, 
Brunner (1980) discusses the strategy problem regarding monetary 
theory. Brunner distinguishes between nonactivist and activist strate-
gies of monetary policy, also known in terms of the rules versus 
discretion debate25. As is well-known, a nonactivist monetary policy 
strategy is characterised by a constant monetary growth path. 
Modigliani and Papademos (1980) discuss the monetary mechanism, that 
is the mechanism through which the monetary authority by controlling 
certain financial variables achieves (more or less) effective control 
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over nominal income. 
Monetary management is according to Lamfalussy (1990) the establish-
ment of intermediate targets and the conduct of short-run monetary 
policy. 
Money control or money stock control are of course widely used and 
stated terminologies. As examples Poole (1976) and (1982) and Bryant 
(1982) can be mentioned. 
Another widely used concept is monetary control, the main topic of 
this paper. Poole and Lieberman (1972), Friedman (1977), Poole (1977), 
Brunner (1980), Lombra (1980), Black (1982) and Pierce (1982) are some 
examples. They all mean with monetary control some kind of control 
over the money stock ("the quantity of money", "a specific monetary 
aggregate", "monetary growth" or "constant monetary growth"). However, 
these interpretations of monetary control seem identical to the 
interpretations of money and money stock control. This is something 
that puzzles me. From a semantic point of view, monetary control seems 
to have a broader implication than just money stock control. Does 
monetary control always implicate money stock control? And also vice 
versa? For example, monetary control could be interpreted as/control 
over the money stock, interest rate(s), exchange rate or combinations 
of these variables (under certain circumstances). Another possible 
interpretation of monetary control could stress the power element of 
control: some kind of political economy approach, which emphasizes the 
influence of certain interest groups on the implementation of monetary 
policy. Some interpretations of monetary control in a power-process 
context will be presented below. 
The final mentioned terminology in table 2.4, i.e. monetary controls, 
contains the already discussed instrument interpretation of monetary 
control. 
In the following analysis, attention will be paid to different inter-
pretations of monetary control in a power-process context. Table 2.5 
provides a global picture of various power-process interpretations. 
For convenience, no attention will be paid to non-conventionalist or 
non-mainstream economie schools of thought such as Marxist or Neo-
Ricardian economics26. 
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Table 2.5 Power-process interpretations of monetary control 
1 Government versus market based monetary control 
2 Political economy approach of monetary control 
3 Various directions of literature on monetary control 
4 Interpretations of the shortened transmlsslon process ("targets and 
indicators approach") 
5 Feasibility of controlling the money stock 
6 Rules versus discretion 
For lack of space in this small paper, and because of already elabora-
te coverage in many publications, no attention will be paid to the 
last four interpretations. The various directions of the literature on 
monetary control have been summarised by Friedman (1975) and Lombra 
(1980) into two main approaches. One approach in monetary control 
literature concentrates on the target and indicators problem. To quote 
Lombra (1980):"One major branch of research proceeded by collapsing 
hundreds of years of monetary research into two equations: one linking 
the Fed's "Instruments" to the monetary aggregates - the so-called 
"intermediate" targets - and the other linking the monetary aggregates 
to the vector of key macroeconomic variables comprising the "final" 
targets or ultimate objectives of policy". The other approach focuses 
on the application of (optimal) control methodologies. 
The question of feasibility of controlling the money stock has been 
extensively discussed, for example in Poole and Lieberman (1972), 
Poole (1976) and Johannes and Rasche (1987). 
The rules versus discretion debate (or passive versus active or 
nonactivist versus activist) has been the topic in articles such as 
Fischer (1990) and Brunner (1980). 
The during the last 25 years extensively discussed targets and indica-
tors approach is summarised in Eijffinger (1986). Eijffinger presents 
also a clear review of the confusing use of words in the targets and 
indicators literature [also excellently discussed in Friedman (1975)]. 
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For example, one group of authors27 uses the terminology of (Instru-
ments, targets, indicators, goals), while another group28 uses the 
opposite terminology of (Instruments, indicators, targets, goals). 
The first interpretation to be discussed more elaborate, i.e. the 
government versus market control interpretation, concerns the so 
called monetary order29. The existing monetary order can be described 
as a "... two-layered system, one layer consisting of the central bank 
or the monetary authorities and the other made up of commercial 
banks"30, with the monetary authorities providing base money. In the 
existing monetary order the amount of base money is consequently under 
control of the monetary authorities, i.e. the government exercises 
monetary control. However, two opposite schools of thought stress the 
primacy of the market with respect to monetary control31. One school 
originates in the work of F. Hayek, the well-known godfather of the 
Austrian School of Economics. Hayek proposes the introduction of 
competing currencies, as well as the maintenance of the issue of base 
money by the government. According to Hayek, the government will abuse 
its power to provide the economy with base money, and therefore 
private agents should have the possibility to create their own, and/or 
use freely foreign currencies. As a result, "... competition between 
issuers will lead to the solution that best fulfils the wishes of the 
public"32. In this system the power of the monetary authorities to 
exert control over the issue of base money is shared by the market. 
The second school, the so called New Monetary Economics, even denies 
the government the right to issue base money33. The proponents of this 
school propose a monetary order without a central bank. In the moneta-
ry order of the New Monetary Economics monetary control is completely 
exercised by the market. 
The political economy approach is an interesting instrument for 
analysing the power and process elements of monetary control. Especi-
ally the question which persons, organisations (-groups of persons) or 
instruments exercise control over the determination of the ultimate 
goals, and consequently over the determination of targets, indicators 
and instruments of monetary policy, could be analysed in a political 
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economy framework. The question which in my opinion is the most 
essential one regarding the problem of monetary control. Therefore, 
the power elements in the policy making and policy implementation 
processes should be included in studies of monetary control. Studies 
which formulate monetary control only in terms of control over the 
money stock neglect these important aspects. 
The political economy approach is embedded in the so called public 
choice theory, which according to Frey (1984) "... seeks to analyse 
political processes, and the interaction between the economy and the 
polity, by using the tools of modern (neoclassical) analysis".34 
In the following analysis, a simple descriptive model of monetary 
control in a power-process interpretation is presented. Figure 2.1 
gives an overview. 
Figure 2.1 Monetary Control in a Power-Process Perspective 
monetary policy 
making 
L 
monetary policy 
implementation 
Monetary control in a power-process perspective can be divided in two 
interrelated sub-processes. Monetary policymaking includes the formu-
lation and choice of the ultimate policy goals by the monetary autho-
rities, the final choice of policy goals, the formulation and choice 
of monetary controls and the formulation and choice of various tar-
gets, indicators and instruments of monetary policy. Figure 2.2 
provides an overview (see next page). 
Various monetary authorities formulate and choose ultimate goals. This 
formulation and choice is influenced to some extent by outside fac-
tors. Finally, during some kind of power struggle the ultimate goals 
Figure 2.2 Monetary policymaking 
Monetary authorities 
formulation and choice of ultimate 
goals by monetary authority X1 1 
final 
choice 
of 
ultimate 
goals 
formulation 
and choice 
of monetary 
controls 
formulation and choice of ultimate 
goals by monetary authority Xn 1 
Extemal influence 
- other government agencies 
- political Darties 
-ot her inter est gi oups, etc. 
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are chosen. Then, the monetary controls are formulated and chosen. In 
this stage the monetary authorities decide (explicitly or implicitly) 
whether they will use informal or formal controls with direct or 
indirect effects. When these controls are selected the targets, 
indicators and Instruments to be used for the implementation of 
monetary policy are respectively formulated and chosen. The implemen-
tation of monetary policy is presented in figure 2.3. 
Figure 2.3 The Implementation of Monetary Policy 
Instruments indicators targets goals 
Figure 2.3 is based on the well known targets and indicators approach. 
Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 are relatively simple and certainly not 
complete and perfect, but offer some orientation for a political 
economy approach of monetary control. 
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3.0 Implications for Japan 
The presented analysls of interpretatlons of monetary control can be 
used in a Japanese context. Accordlng to my opinion especially the 
political economy approach of monetary control offers some interesting 
possibilities. 
In an earlier stage of my research, I concentrated on the topic of 
monetary control in a globalised financial world. As part of this 
orientation I started to think about what exactly monetary control is, 
resulting in the above made distinction between the instrument and 
power-process interpretatlons of monetary control. This classification 
resulted also from my growing believe that monetary control in Japan 
shouldn't be interpreted as strict control of only the money stock (in 
a monetarist fashion). The following reasons support this believe. 
First, during 1990 the increase of the broad monetary aggregate M2 + 
CDs in a specific month from the same month a year earlier fluctuated 
between a minimum of 8.5% in December and a maximum of 13.2% in April 
and May. However, in 1991 growth of M2 + CDs decreased to 3.5% in May 
(see table 2.6 next page). These differences in money growth figures 
are quite remarkable. To me, it looks like the Bank of Japan implemen-
ted for some reason a relative loose monetary policy during the major 
part of 1990 and changed during the last quarter to a restrictive 
policy. Based on money growth figures of the last year and a half, the 
Bank of Japan doesn't seem to attach much importance to money growth 
stability. Of course, the possibility exists that the Bank of Japan in 
fact wanted to attain a stable growth of the money stock but failed to 
achieve it because of some difficulties experienced in implementing 
monetary policy with respect to this goal. However, this possibility 
seems unlikely. If monetary authorities really want to control the 
money stock around a certain growth path, they have the opportunity to 
do so. Accordlng to literature on monetary policy and monetary con-
trol, when the institutional framework and the operating procedures 
have the proper form, monetary authorities are quite able to control 
the money stock [the "feasibility of monetary 
control" question; see for example Johannes and Rasche (1987), Poole 
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Table 2.6 Rate of change M2 + CDs 
Jan Feb Mar AprMay Jun Jui Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar AprMay 
1990 I 1991 I 
• 1 Series 1 
Comparison with same month one year ago 
Source: Economie Statistics Monthly, Japan Economie Journal 
and Lieberman (1972), Poole (1976) and Poole (1991a)]. So probably the 
Bank of Japan had some other priorities with respect to the money 
stock. 
Second, staff members have frequently declared that the Bank of Japan 
doesn't pursue a strict monetarist interpretation of monetary policy 
implementation. For example Mr. Y. Suzuki (former director of the 
Institute for Monetary and Economie Studies, the Bank of Japan) has 
explicitly mentioned this orientation of the Bank of Japan:"..., the 
policy attitude of the Bank of Japan over the past ten years, ..., is 
in my interpretation neither that of post-Keynesian "discretionary 
fine tuning" nor that of a "x% rule". It is discretionary in that it 
follows for gradual tuning of monetary growth, and it conforms to a 
rule in the sense that it stabilizes monetary growth as touch as 
possible and gives Information to the public about policy in the form 
of forecast announcements. An appropriate term may be "eclectic 
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gradualism"."35 Mr. R. Shimamoto, (former?) executlve director of the 
Bank of Japan, also has stressed the pragmatic orientation wlth 
respect to the money stock of the Japanese central bank:"..., even 
though the Bank of Japan emphasizes the money supply, we are not blind 
to other indicators. We consider money supply movements in an overall 
framework that includes prices, output, the balance of payments, 
Interest rates at home and abroad, movements in the foreign exchange 
market, and attitudes of financial intermediaries to lending. 
. . . Thus, the attitude of the Bank of Japan toward the money supply 
is, in a word, pragmatic. Given uncertainty, shifts in functions, and 
instabilities, we believe this stance most appropriate to conditions 
at home and abroad."36 These opinions have been supported by Mr. M. 
Okabe (former director of Division I, Institute for Monetary and 
Economie Studies): "... the formula now employed in Japan is more 
aptly called a money-focused monetary pollcy rather than a monetary-
targeting policy. It could be described as eclectic gradualism. .. ., 
the Bank of Japan has, in f act, managed its monetary policy in a 
pragmatic fashion, keeping careful watch on such other indicators as 
prices, production, balance of payments, currency rates and bank 
loans."37 And also in a different form by Mr.T. Tamura, director of 
the Credit and Market Management Department of the Bank of Japan:"The 
Bank of Japan began publishing its forecast of M2+CDs in 1978, alt-
hough we have taken a rather cautious approach compared to some other 
countries in the sense that it was given the status of a "projection" 
and not a "target"."38 
According to these statements of staff or former staff members of the 
Bank of Japan monetary policy in Japan shouldn't be interpreted as a 
(strict) monetarist policy. 
Of course, given the economie success story of Japan some monetarist 
economists claim the opposite. For example, according to M. Friedman 
"... Japan illustrates a policy that is less monetarist in rhetoric 
than the policies foliowed by the United States and Great Britain but 
far more monetarist in practice."3 9 
However, the f acts remain that the Bank of Japan firstly uses inter-
bank interest rates as indicators and not the by monetarist economists 
prescribed monetary base and secondly doesn't adhere to a strict 
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target strategy with respect to the money stock* °. Against the back-
ground of these conclusions, in combination with the statements of 
(former) staff members of the Bank of Japan and other observers*1, the 
monetarist claim of a monetarist focused monetary policy in Japan 
doesn't seem to be very credible (it has also to be mentioned that the 
supporters of the monetarist claim don't present convincing theoreti-
cal and/or empirical evidence with respect to their claim). Further 
evidence for the absence of strict monetary targeting in Japanese 
monetary policy is presented in note 41. 
Third, the pragmatic interpretation by the Bank of Japan of the so 
called money focused monetary policy is reflected in the use of 
several variables as (intermediate) targets. This point is stressed by 
several authors. For example, Hamada and Hayashi (1985) mention on 
page 99:"... monetary policy in Japan has been successful because the 
perspective of the Bank is multi-scoped rather than single-scoped on a 
single monetary aggregate." This statement has been supported by 
Suzuki (1986), p.73-74:"Thus, M2 + CDs has a higher degree of exoge-
neity than the nominal and real real interest rates, and is therefore 
the most appropriate indicator to use as the intermediate target. 
However, intermediate financial variables, such as bank credit, 
interest rates, and the exchange rate, retain some inmportance. An 
eclectic attitude toward policy implementation, paying f uil attention 
to intermediate financial variables in addition to money, is necessary 
because many factors including unpredictable expectations can disrupt 
the transmission channels." 
In the following analysis, the views of several authors with respect 
to the possible use of several (intermediate) targets by the Bank of 
Japan will be presented. The figures show the interpretations of these 
authors with respect to the use of (intermediate) targets/objectives 
by the BoJ. In the figures the respective terminologies of these 
authors will be used. The reader should regard these figures as just 
some helpful illustrations of different opinions. 
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Cargill and Hutchlson (1988) 
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real target 
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Interest rates I I 
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investments 
Suzuki (1985)/(1987a), Miyake (1989), Kuroda (1989), Suzuki, Kuroda 
and Shirakawa (1988) 
Operating 
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instruments 
interbank 
interest 
rates 
M2 > CDs 
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Suzuki (1986)/(1987c) 
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27 
Nakao and Horil (1991) and Tamura (1991) 
Van R i x t e l (1990) 
Operating Intermediate 
target/variables objectives 
Instruments 
Short term 
money market 
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(market) 
interest rates 
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Exchange rate 
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Hryant (1991)) 
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Okabe (1990) 
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Bank of Japan (1985) 
Bat); of 
Japan 
interbani: 
interest 
rates 
open nirketl 
ii te rest 
rates 
unregulated | 
liiancial 
assets 
overall 
economie 
activity 
loao 
interest 
rates 
T 
deposits at 
banks,e te. 
bond 
yields 
n N 
corporale 
investneits 
leiding 
by 
banks 
motey 
denaid 
nonetary 
nggregotes 
money 
supply 
From these figures, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
- First, the monetary aggregate M2 + CDs is most of ten mentioned as 
(intermediate) target. The strongest supportive statements of this 
view can be found in the publications of Y. Suzuki, the former direc-
tor of the Institute for Monetary and Economie Studies of the Bank of 
Japan, and other members of this Institute. See for example Suzuki 
(1985) and Suzuki (19887a), Suzuki, Kuroda and Shirakawa (1988), 
Miyake (1989), Kuroda (1989) and Okabe (1990). It has to be mentioned 
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that some observers are rather sceptical about the use of the money 
stock as an intermediate target by the Bank of Japan. See for example 
Bryant (1990). 
- Second, some authors also emphasize the use of the exchange rate as 
an intermediate target by the Bank of Japan. Hutchison is the most 
outspoken author with respect to this view. See for example Hutchison 
(1986b) and (1988). 
- Third, as a result of the recent orientation of the Bank of Japan on 
the interest-rate-expenditure channel regarding the implementation of 
monetary policy42, some authors stress the importance of interest 
rates and/or private expenditures as (intermediate) targets. For 
example, see Cargill (1985) and Cargill and Hutchison (1988). 
- Fourth, in recent publications some staffmembers of the Bank of 
Japan have mentioned the increased reservations the Bank of Japan 
applies to its interpretations of the money stock and its enhanced 
attention with respect to market interest rates. See Nakao and Horii 
(1991) and Tamura (1991) (see also Batten, Blackwell, Kim, Nocero and 
Ozeki (1989)). 
It will be clear from the above presented analysis that with respect 
to the intermediate targets used by the Bank of Japan no clear agree-
ment exists amongst some of the most famous observers of Japanse 
monetary policy (I certainly don't want to include myself in this 
group of observers). As a result, the obvious question arises which 
variable(s) are actually being used by the Bank of Japan as target? In 
other words, which economie variables are controlled by the Bank of 
Japan? How should one interpret monetary control in Japan? According 
to my opinion, 2 approaches offer the best opportunities to answer 
these questions. 
First, an interpretation from an political economy perspective may 
generate some interesting answers. As we have seen, monetary control 
in Japan shouldn't be interpreted as strict control of only the money 
stock. The Bank of Japan seems to have a multi-scope orientation 
towards the use of targets. What interests me is why the Bank of Japan 
pursues this orientation. Is it because the Bank of Japan believes 
this approach offers the best results with respect to the implementa-
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tion of lts policy? Or is it because some other actors/institutions to 
some extent "force" the Japanese central bank to control certain 
economie variables? This last question was the major reason for me to 
distinguish between the instrument and power-process interpretations 
of monetary control. Maybe an approach in accordance with figure 2.2 
can reach to a solution. 
Second, the question which economie variables are being controlled by 
the Bank of Japan can be answered by using certain, so called optimal 
control techniques. These techniques are rather complicated and 
require the specification of a macroeconomic model. However, recent 
research has generated some very interesting results*3. 
For me, the challenge is to integrate these 2 approaches and to 
provide some more conclusive results with respect to the specific 
nature of monetary control in Japan. Only then one can draw some 
funded conclusions about monetary control in Japan in the context of a 
globalised financial world. 
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Notes: 
(1): For an interesting analysis see Klamer (1985), especially chapter 
13. 
(2): Lombra (1980), p.270. 
(3): For example see B. Friedman (1975) and Lombra (1980). 
(4): The Oxford Guide to the English language, edition Book Club 
Associates by arrangement with Oxford University Press. London: Guild 
Publishing, 1984. 
(5): Tinbergen (1952), p.7. Italics not in original. 
(6): Tinbergen (1952), p.70. Italics not in original. 
(7): More specific, Tinbergen dtscerns between data, targets, Instru-
ments and irrelevant variables. See Tinbergen (1952), p.6-7. 
(8): Tinbergen (1952), p.53. In the following analysis, a process 
interpretation regarding economie policy will be used. 
(9): This analysis differs in some extent from the traditional termi-
nology in Dutch literature regarding the supervision of the Nederland-
sche Bank (the Netherlands central bank). Structural policy in this 
paper has a much broader meaning than the concept of "structuur-
beleid" of the Nederlandsche Bank in Dutch literature. The main reason 
for this is to include the possibility of explicit ministry of finance 
policies. Prudential policy is equivalent to "bedrijfseconomisch 
toezicht" of the Nederlandsche Bank in Dutch (business or micro 
economie supervision). See Wessels (1987), p.94-107. Monetary policy 
strictly defined contains also possible monetary policy actions of the 
ministry of finance and consequently is not equivalent to "algemeen-
economisch toezicht" (general or macro economie supervision) of the 
Netherlands central bank. For example, in some countries foreign 
exchange market operations and even some domestic open market opera-
tions are conducted by the ministry of finance. 
(10): Translation of Wytzes (1978). p.1. 
(11): Wessels (1987), p.97. In the Cross Report (BIS (1986)) the 
terminology of prudential policy is also used. The report distin-
guishes explicitly between so called macro-prudential policy, i.e. the 
policy regarding the "... safety and soundness of the broad financial 
system and payments mechanism" (BIS (1986), p.2), and monetary policy. 
Consequently, the report seems to regard monetary policy in the sense 
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of strict monetary policy formulated in this study. 
(12): Liquidity or reserve requirements have also a monetary policy 
(in strict sense) character. In this study reserve requirements will 
be explicitly included in the analysis of monetary control. 
(13): The monetary authorities include in general the ministry of 
finance and the central bank. Sometimes some other governmental 
institutions have to be taken into account as well. For example in 
Japan the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the 
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications exert some influence in 
monetary and supervisory policy. Burger (1971) uses the terminology of 
monetary policymakers, i.e. those individuals who, acting alone or in 
groups, have the power to manipulate the monetary policy instruments. 
(14): Horvitz (1979), p.348. For example, open market operations in 
Horwitz's terminology are called general controls. Federal Reserve 
control over stock market margin requirements are an example of 
selective controls. 
(15): Other possible classifications: 
- Regulatory monetary controls: 
* formal regulatory controls 
* informal regulatory controls 
- Non-regulatory monetary controls: 
* market based controls 
* non-market based controls 
or: 
- Direct monetary controls: 
* formal regulatory controls 
* informal regulatory controls 
- Indirect monetary controls: 
* market based controls 
* non-market based controls 
(16): In the terminology of target oriented approaches of control 
quite often the concept regulation is used instead of control. For 
example, Teranishi (1986) discusses the regulation of the Japanese 
financial system in terms of regulation of interest rates, regulation 
of entry into the markets and regulation of international capital 
movements. An elaborate analysis is presented in Teranishi (1990). For 
34 
further literature regarding target oriented approaches of control 
(or, in more common terminology, regulation) regarding the Japanese 
financial system see for example van Rixtel (1988), Suzuki (1987a), 
Suzuki (1987b) and Suzuki (1989). It has to be mentioned that the used 
terminology of target oriented controls has nothing to do with the 
word target in the analysis of monetary policy in terms of Instru-
ments , indicators, targets and goals. 
(17): Pierce (1982), p.775. Pierce divides regulations into three 
categories. To quote:"The first category involves required reserve 
ratios and the definitions of the liabilities against which reserve 
requirements are imposed. The second category involves regulations 
with respect to interest rates and other relevant prices. The third 
category of regulations involves accounting procedures such as lagged 
reserve accounting". (Pierce (1982), p.776.) 
(18): Personal interview. 
(19): Poole (1990), p.266. 
(20): Friedman (1975). p.450. 
(21): Friedman defines the instrument problem as "... the choice of 
the variable(s) over which the central bank will exert direct control" 
(Friedman (1975), p.448). The intermediate target problem "... is the 
choice of a variable, usually a readily observable financial market 
price or quantity, which the central bank will treat, for purposes of 
a short-run operating guide, as if it were the true ultimate target of 
monetary policy" (Friedman (1975), p.456). For an elaborate discussion 
of the instrument and intermediate target problems see Friedman 
(1990). 
(22): Burger (1971), p.163. 
(23): B.Friedman (1975), p.443. 
(24): Black (1982), p.759. 
(25): See for example Fischer (1990). 
(26): See for example Plattel (1985). 
(27): See for example Burger (1971), p.166-170. 
(28): See for example B.Friedman (1975). 
(29): This analysis draws heavily on Visser (1989). 
(30): Visser (1989), p.1. 
(31): Visser (1989), p.1-4. 
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(32): Visser (1989), p.3. 
(33): Visser (1989), p.3-4. 
(34): Frey (1984), p.5. 
(35): Suzuki (1985), p.9. 
(36): Shimamoto (1982), p.82. 
(37): Okabe (1990), p.16, p.18. 
(38): Tamura (1991), p.8. 
(39): M. Friedman (1985), p.27. 
(40): In this paper, monetray targeting is defined as a certain (x%) 
rule for money growth. Some authors stick to a different interpreta-
tion of monetary targeting. See for example Fischer (1988), p.150: 
"Monetary targeting serves the valuable purpose of forcing the central 
bank to announce its intentions for the next year, and of explaining 
why it failed to meet them this year. Provided the targets are taken 
seriously, targeting lends a coherence to monetary policy that opera-
ting by the "touch and feel" of the market does not. ... The adoption 
of monetary targeting does not necessarily imply inactive policies. 
None of the four countries, including Japan, has tried to keep money 
growth constant, and all have responded to the business cycle, to 
velocity shocks, and to the exchange rate". 
(41): Okabe (1990), p.17-18, presents a summary:" Other analyses, 
however, doubt that the Bank of Japan has really emphasized money 
supply trends in managing its monetary policy. They argue that (1) no 
statistical analyses support the observation that, whenever dispari-
ties occurred between money projections and actual values, the central 
bank responded by guiding the actual values closer to the projections 
through interest rate management; and (2) no empirical analyses bear 
out the contention that the Bank of Japan has intentionally held down 
the growth trend in the money supply." One of the most outspoken 
supporters of this view is M. Hutchison. See for example Hutchison 
(1982):"..., the Bank of Japan also has not achieved the decline in 
money growth by following monetary control procedures typically 
prescribed by monetarists." And also Hutchison (1986a), p.43-44:"... 
the move away from direct credit controls toward more flexible short-
term interest rates does not represent a "money focused" monetary 
policy in the sense of a close adherence to a constant monetary growth 
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rule. In particular, money variability has not declined in recent 
years in contrast to interest rate variability. .. . the Bank of Japan 
has not systematlcally moved interbank interest rates in response to 
deviations of money growth from its narrow targeted range since either 
the move to floating exchange rates in 1973 or the announcement of 
money projections starting in 1978. ... The evidence suggests that a 
more flexible approach to policy is foliowed, and that Japan's success 
at maintaining low and stable inflation and stable output growth 
cannot be attributed to its adoption of traditional monetarist policy 
prescriptions." Further support of the non-monetarist orientation of 
monetary policy in Japan is presented in Cargill and Rovama (1988), 
p.175:"Has the BOJ adopted a monetarist strategy, or has it achieved 
what appear to be monetarist results via an operating strategy that is 
clearly nonmonetarist - that is, an operating strategy based on the 
interbank market interest rate? . . . First, the operating tactics of 
the BOJ have not changed significantly; that is, the BOJ clearly 
operates with an interest-rate-focused rather than a money-supply-
focused procedure similar to the one used before the initiation of 
reform. Second, there has been a subtle and gradual shift toward 
policy Instruments - open-market operations in particular - that 
exploit the interest-rate-expenditure channel and the enhanced role 
that flexible interests have been given by financial reform. Third, 
there has been a major shift in the strategy of BOJ policy associated 
with the departure from the fixed exchange-rate Standard after 1973 
and the adverse effects of the inflation of 1973 and 1974. The BOJ 
clearly has a price stbility objective." 
A summary is presented in Cargill and Hutchison (1988). Dotsey (1986) 
also denies the use of traditional monetarist procedures by the Bank 
of Japan:"..., Japan achieves results that are monetarist in nature 
without using the procedures frequently advocated by monetarists." See 
also Bryant (1990), p. 33/34:"Despite some foreign monetarists' praises 
of the Bank of Japan for following monetarist policies, it seems 
incorrect to me to label the substance of Japanese monetary policy as 
monetarist. ... Within the Bank of Japan itself, there are interesting 
differences of nuance about what the "money-focused monetary policy" 
has been and should be. But I have been unable to find, even among 
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those members of the Bank of Japan staff most supportive of an increa-
sed emphasis on money, an advocacy of using the money stock as an 
intermediate target in an explicit two-stage, intermediate-target 
strategy. . . . Yoshio Suzuki can fairly be described as one of those 
within the Bank of Japan most sympathetic to the increased emphasis on 
money. ... Other influential members of the Bank of Japan staff, 
however, have not been fully comfortable with Suzuki's descriptions." 
See also Ito (1989). 
Cargill and Hutchison (1988), p.241, characterize the policy of the 
Bank of Japan as eclectic monetarism:"... While the evidence suggests 
that the Bank of Japan does not target monetary growth according to 
monetarism, the effect of its policies has been to achieve a well-
defined long-run monetary growth path. Given the close long-run 
relationship between inflation and money and the undeniable importance 
of price stability in Japan, the Bank of Japan has de facto achieved a 
monetarist outcome. Perhaps it would be better to characterize the 
policy as a form of eclectic monetarism in which the Bank of Japan 
does not adhere to specific monetary growth targets and controls the 
money supply via a policy focused on interest rates. However, the 
commitment to stable and low inflation is necessarily reflected by a 
long-run stable monetary growth rate." 
Regarding the question of monetary growth targeting former Governor of 
the Bank of Japan Mr. Haruo Mavekawa made an interesting statement in 
the fourth issue of Kredit und Kapital in 1979:"..., starting in July 
1978, the Bank of Japan made it a practice to publish, in the first 
month of each quarter, the projected growth of M2 during the current 
quarter. It is hoped that the public announcement of such projections 
will help deepen the general public's understanding on the important 
problem of the money supply, and thereby will permit the authorities 
to resort more flexibly to monetary restraint, when needed. The bank 
has not yet started to set a specific numerical target for monetary 
growth, partly because empirical studies so f ar carried out have not 
found a demand for money function stable enough to justify normative 
monetary targetry, and partly also because experience with the control 
over the money supply has not yet demonstrated the sufficiently high 
degree of precision required for the adoption of such a strategy." 
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Obviously, the Bank of Japan was thinking at the end of the seventies 
whether to set specific monetary growth targets or not, but at that 
moment decided not to do so. Given the arguments presented in the 
analysis it seems defensible to assume also the absence of specific 
monetary growth targets in the eighties. Some recent support for this 
statement is is provided by Nakao and Horil (1991), p.12, p.16-17: 
"..., The Bank of Japan has never undertaken targeting of monetary 
aggregates as central banks in other major countries have done, which 
reflects its pragmatic approach to the subject. In fact, at the outset 
of publication of monetary forecasts, the Bank said it would naturally 
pay particular attention to money supply in addition to other economie 
and financial indicators but that the publication of its forecast of 
money supply was rather intended to help deepen public understanding 
of money supply. ... monetary policy cannot be decided on the basis of 
a limited number of economie and financial indicators. Monetary 
policy, of course, must be decided viewing a wide range of economie 
and financial variables as discussed earlier. This attitude may be 
criticized as lacking discipline. but it is the very reason that 
monetary policy still remains something of an art". And also by Tamura 
(1991), p.9, p.11:"..., the Bank of Japan has increased the number of 
reservations it applies to the interpretation of money supply since 
the mid-1980s, although emphasis on stabilizing money supply growth in 
the medium term has been kept. ... As such, the Bank of Japan con-
stantly watches a wide range of economie and financial developments, 
and makes monetary policy decisions in a pragmatic manner." See also 
Batten, Blackwell, Kim, Nocera and Ozeki (1989), p.31:"It would appear 
that the Bank of Japan is increasingly focusing on influencing the 
short-term interest rates and directly influencing the general economy 
rather than conducting monetary policy through the strict application 
of monetary targeting. This new approach is expected to enhance the 
effectiveness of Japanese monetary policy to the extent that official-
ly-induced changes in the shorter-term interest rates impart appropri-
ate signals to the banking system and the rest of the economy." So, 
according to these authors the Bank of Japan applied some form of 
monetary targeting, but has focused attention more on interest rates 
in recent years (more specific after the money market reform of 
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November 1988. See Batten es. (1989), p.31):"The November reform 
marked a turning point in the conduct of monetary policy in Japan.") 
It has to be mentioned that also Tamura (1991) and Nakao and Horii 
(1991) stress the fact that in recent years the Bank of Japan seems to 
pay more attention to interest rates and has developed some doubts 
with respect to the money stock. See Tamura (1991), p.9:"..., the Bank 
of Japan has increased the number of reservatlons it applies to the 
interpretation of money supply since the mid-1980s, although emphasis 
on stabllizing money supply growth in the medium term has been kept. 
... The Bank of Japan has increased its attention to market interest 
rates in view of the deepening financial markets, in which interest 
rates fluctuate freely and interaction between market interest rates 
and economie activity became greater." And also Nakao and Horii 
(1991), p.16:"Firstly, the Bank has increased the number of reserva-
tions it applies to its interpretations of money supply, bank credit, 
and other volume indicators of finance. Secondly, it has enhanced 
attention given to market interest rate developments. (Thirdly, as f ar 
as exchange rates are concerned, the Bank has, on balance, placed more 
importance on them, albeit to a varying degree, depending on specific 
economie conditions)." 
(42): Cargill (1985), p.144. See also the vast amount of publications 
by Y. Suzuki. 
(43): See Swank (1990). 
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